An Equilibrium Analysis of the Simultaneous Ascending Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
We provide a Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item, e.g. the license for the region where it has monopoly power, and that global bidders’ valuation functions are convex. For th...
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We review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the “simultaneous ascending auction,” which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the US, with efficiency of the final allocation as the statutory goal. We analyze some capabilities and inherent limitations of the auction, the roles of various detailed rules, the possibilities for i...
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This paper investigates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an ascending-price core-selecting auction, which was recently used in the U.K. spectrum auction. We suppose that there are two goods, two local, and one global bidders. The local bidders demand only one of the goods, whereas the global bidder wants both. Although local bidders generally face the threshold problem and have incentives to...
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We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders c...
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This paper proposes an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when the seller is restricted to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid and agents have interdependent values. This ascending auction generalizes Bikhchandani et al. (2011) who assume agents have independent private values; and Perry and Reny (2005) who study multi-unit good auctions. The key feature of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1476837