An experiment on Nash implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Nash implementation
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount...
متن کاملA Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation∗
This note considers (complete information) Nash-implementation when mixed strategies are properly accounted for and the outcome space is infinite. We first construct an example in which preferences over lotteries fail the Archemedian axiom and show that, even under the classical sufficient conditions for implementation, the canonical mechanism for implementation fails: there exists a mixed-Nash...
متن کاملImminent Nash Implementation∗
We introduce delay in simultaneous-move mechanisms. Delay is infinitesimal in equilibrium, hence the name: imminent implementation. We show that mechanisms with delay implement rules that are not implementable without delay in Nash equilibrium and its refinements. We obtain a version of the monotonicity condition that is necessary and sufficient for imminent implementability. If the domain incl...
متن کاملNash implementation via hyperfunctions
Hyperfunctions are social choice rules which assign sets of alternatives to preference profiles over sets. So, they are more general objects compared to standard (social choice) correspondences. Thus every correspondence can be expressed in terms of an equivalent hyperfunction. We postulate the equivalence between implementing a correspondence and its equivalent hyperfunction. We give a partial...
متن کاملAn Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play
We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan’s model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects’ choices in nearly all periods. When the “true” game defined by players’ private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the expe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00094-x