AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF DOUBLE-TRACK AUCTION

An Experimental Study of Auction Behaviour

A laboratory simulation of property sales revealed that in a mildly optimistic market, auction prices returned premiums to the rational capitalised values, whereas tender sale did not. Results suggest that auction premiums may tend to peak near the middle of the auction, however, the properties were sold in order of diminishing value, so further research may be necessary in order to distinguish...

A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

Combinatorial Auction Bandwidth Trading: An Experimental Study

An Ascending Double Auction

We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders c...

Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction

In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with...