An exploration of third parties’ preference for compensation over punishment: six experimental demonstrations

Contracting with Third Parties

odels of bilateral contracting, such as the canonical holdup model, typically assume that third parties are not available. Given this assumption, the equilibrium outcome is not first-best efficient if contracts can be renegotiated. To be more specific, suppose an architect and a builder must cooperate to build a building. The quality of the building will depend on three things: the quality of t...

an application of fuzzy logic for car insurance underwriting

در ایران بیمه خودرو سهم بزرگی در صنعت بیمه دارد. تعیین حق بیمه مناسب و عادلانه نیازمند طبقه بندی خریداران بیمه نامه براساس خطرات احتمالی آنها است. عوامل ریسکی فراوانی می تواند بر این قیمت گذاری تاثیر بگذارد. طبقه بندی و تعیین میزان تاثیر گذاری هر عامل ریسکی بر قیمت گذاری بیمه خودرو پیچیدگی خاصی دارد. در این پایان نامه سعی در ارائه راهی جدید برای طبقه بندی عوامل ریسکی با استفاده از اصول و روش ها...

Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment: An Experimental Investigation

Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected penalty depends on both the probability of punishment and the severity of the punishment if caught. A key question in the economics of crime literature is whether increasing the probability of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the severity of punishment. This...

Towards Tiny Trusted Third Parties

Many security protocols hypothesize the existence of a trusted third party (TTP) to ease handling of computation and data too sensitive for the other parties involved. Subsequent discussion usually dismisses these protocols as hypothetical or impractical, under the assumption that trusted third parties cannot exist. However, the last decade has seen the emergence of hardware-based devices that,...

Exploitable Results by Third Parties