An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games

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چکیده

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An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2010

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1712102