An inverse economic lot-sizing approach to eliciting supplier cost parameters
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An inverse economic lot-sizing approach to eliciting supplier cost parameters
This paper proposes an inverse lot-sizing model for eliciting the cost parameters (the setup, holding, and backlog costs) of a supplier from earlier demand vs. optimal lot-size pairs. It is assumed that the supplier solves a single-item, multi-period, uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs to optimality to calculate its lot-sizes, and the buyer is aware of this fact. The inverse optimiz...
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In this paper we derive a new structural property for an optimal solution of the economic lot-sizing problem with time-invariant cost parameters. We show that the total holding cost in an order interval of an optimal solution is bounded from above by a quantity proportional to the setup cost and the logarithm of the number of periods in the interval. Since we can also show that this bound is ti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Production Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0925-5273
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.06.024