Analytical solution of kth price auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Buy-price English auction
In English auctions, introducing a buy price, i.e., the seller’s maximum price bid at which any bidder at any time can immediately win the auction, allows the seller to gain higher expected utility than that in a traditional auction when either the seller or the buyers are risk-averse. If the seller sets the buy price high enough, the buyprice English auction is efficient and guarantees the hig...
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Second-price auctions are designed to induce people to reveal their private preferences for a good. Laboratory evidence suggests that while these auctions do a reasonable job on aggregate, they fall short at the individual level, especially for bidders who are off-margin of the market-clearing price. Herein we introduce and explore whether a random nth-price auction can engage all bidders to bi...
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The Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) has been widely used by search engines to sell ad slots. Previous studies have shown that the pure Price Of Anarchy (POA) of GSP is 1.25 when there are two ad slots and 1.259 when three ad slots. For the cases with more than three ad slots, however, only some untight upper bounds of the pure POA were obtained. In this work, we improve previous results ...
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در این پایان نامه روش جدیدی مبتنی بر روش حل معادلات دیفرانسیل پارهای بر اساس روش توابع پایه برای حل مسایل ارتعاش اجباری واستاتیک تیرها و صفحات لایه ای ارایه شده است که می توان تفاوت این روش با روش های متداول توابع پایه را در استفاده از توابع هموار در ارضاء معادلات حاکم و شرایط مرزی دانست. در روش ارایه شده در این پایاننامه از معادله تعادل به عنوان معادله حاکم بر رفتار سیستم استفاده شده است که مو...
15 صفحه اولOn the Complete Information First-Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution
Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information rstprice sealed-bid auction mechanism when the bidding space has a nite grid. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that there always exists a high price equilibriumwhich can be considered the intuitive solution(an agent wit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00729-x