Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
Let V be a society whose members express weak preferences about two alternatives. We show simple representation formulae that are valid for all, and only, the elements of various classes non-manipulable social choice functions on V. represent entire class functions, its subclasses corresponding to further properties. focus mainly anonymity. Efficiency neutrality up one voter also considered. As consequence formulae, cardinalities some these established. Notably, we number anonymous is 2n+1 if contains n members.
منابع مشابه
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
Gibbard [Gibbard, A., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587– 602] and Satterthwaite [Satterthwaite, M., 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10,187–217] show that an anonymous social choice function with more than two alternative...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.007