Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Counterexample to the Robust and Anti-luck Virtue Epistemologies
This paper begins with an introduction to four different prominent versions of process reliabilism about knowledge, namely, the simple K-reliabilism, John Greco’s robust virtue epistemology, Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and the Goldmanian Kreliabilism. Its main objective is to offer a counterexample, namely, the fewer barn façades case, to the anti-luck virtue epistemology,...
متن کاملTwo for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance
This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck. Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is ca...
متن کاملAnti-luck Virtue Epistemology
It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledgean anti-luck intuition and an ability intuitionand that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledgeanti-luck virtue epistemologywhich can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in...
متن کاملManaging the President’s Program: Necessary and Contingent Truths
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متن کاملSensitivity, Safety, and Anti-luck Epistemology
This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophia
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0048-3893,1574-9274
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0