Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology

It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledgean anti-luck intuition and an ability intuitionand that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledgeanti-luck virtue epistemologywhich can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in...

Anti-luck (too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard (et al. 2010, 2012a, 2012b) has recently shifted his view from an account that primarily understands knowledge in terms of the safety principle (a view mainly developed in his 2005 monograph on epistemic luck) to an ‘impure’ variety of virtue epistemology, which combines the safety principle with a weakened virtue-theoretic condition, a view that he calls anti-luck virtue epist...

Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-luck Epistemology

This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.

A Counterexample to the Robust and Anti-luck Virtue Epistemologies

This paper begins with an introduction to four different prominent versions of process reliabilism about knowledge, namely, the simple K-reliabilism, John Greco’s robust virtue epistemology, Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and the Goldmanian Kreliabilism. Its main objective is to offer a counterexample, namely, the fewer barn façades case, to the anti-luck virtue epistemology,...

Epistemic Courage and Epistemic Virtue