Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets

Merger in the Round: Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition

We examine the incentives for merger and collusion in a market characterized by differentiated consumers. Firms offer differentiated products and serve specific customer segments. The nature of interaction among firms largely determines the choice of a partner for merger, and Bertrand, Stackelberg, and collusive cases are investigated. In comparison to other types of markets (i.e., those charac...

Measuring Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers When Buyer Power Is Concentrated

summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 1976, Purdue University; M.S. (Mathematics), 1978, Purdue University; M.S. (Economics), 1978, Purdue University; Ph.D. (Economics), 1980, Purdue University. **Professor of Economics, University of British Columbia. B.A. (Economics), 1977, University of British Columbia; M.A. (Economics), 1977, University of British Columbia; Ph.D. (Economics), 1982, University o...

Mergers in Bidding Markets

We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders’ equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In the first, single-aspect model, the valuation of the merged firm is the maximum of the valuations of...

Margin squeeze in fixed - network telephony markets : competitive or anticompetitive ?

Does the Dearth of Anticompetitive Mergers Mean More Competition in Imperfectly Competitive Industries?

We study mergers in a duopoly with differentiated products and noisy observations of firms’ actions. Firms select dynamically optimal actions that are not static best responses and merger incentives arise endogenously when firms sufficiently deviate from their collusive actions. The incentive to merge trades off the gains from avoiding price wars against the gains from a monopoly net of the fix...