Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact ...
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We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit-Stiglitz when Þrms sell multiple products. Both products and Þrms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers Þrst decide upon a Þrm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case) . We use it to determine the...
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This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, thoug...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140054