Antitrust Private Enforcement and the Binding Effect of Public Enforcement Decisions

Antitrust Enforcement ∗

This article explores the enforcement of those laws intended to promote competitive markets through the prohibition of certain practices such as price-fixing, welfare-reducing mergers, and monopolization. The discovery and prosecution of violations are examined including the role of leniency programs. The determination of penalties is investigated with an assessment of their relationship to opt...

Private Antitrust Enforcement Revisited: The Role of Private Incentives to Report Evidence to the Antitrust Authority

It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both...

Public Participation in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws

Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights

Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We derive the optimal fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under ...