Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets
A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein–Safra–Thomson ‘ordinal Nash’ outcome is investigated in the Peters–Wakker ‘revealed group preferences’ framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classifica...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.006