Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting
Professor Einer Elhauge’s provocative article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2009), contests two propositions on which efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have largely agreed: (1) that there should be no tying liability absent substantial tied market foreclosure (a position contrary to the legal status quo), and (2) that co...
متن کاملCumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets*
In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of liability for harm) can be considered independently of market performance concerns (e.g., market structure and competition). Moreover, the classical analysis finds that all li...
متن کاملImperfect Observability , Tort Liability Rules , and Incentive for Care ∗
This paper studies an economic model of tort liability rules and considers litigation between a firm and a consumer, under the assumption that the consumer may not perfectly observe the firm’s action. We compare two alternative tort liability rules: the Negligence rule and strict liability with contributory negligence. We consider the noiseless case as a benchmark, and show that under those two...
متن کاملOn Time-Consistent Policy Rules for Heterogeneous Discounting Programs
This article considers a new concept of social optimum for an economy populated by agents with heterogeneous discount factors. It is based upon an approach that constrains decision rules to be temporally consistent: these are stationary and unequivocally ruled by the state variable. For agents who differ only in their discount factors and have equal weights in the planner’s objective, the tempo...
متن کاملRelative performance of liability rules : Experimental
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm’s investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We determine ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1781130