Approval Voting and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian framework of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This note explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and...
متن کاملQuantum voting and violation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Abstract We propose a quantum voting system in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our scheme violates a quantum analogue of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, which states that every (classical) constitution endowed with three innocuous-seeming properties is a dictatorship. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement of votes feature in voting tactics available t...
متن کاملApproval Voting and Parochialism
In hypothetical scenarios involving two groups (nations or groups of workers), subjects voted on three proposals: one helped group A (their group), one helped B, and one helped both groups, more than the average of the first two but less than their maximum. When subjects voted for one proposal, most voted for the one that helped group A. This result is “parochial” because it helps the voter’s o...
متن کاملDice games and Arrows theorem
We observe that non-transitivity is not the most general way that Arrows impossibility theorem is reected in dice games. Non-transitivity in dice games is a well-known phenomenon. It was described in several Scienti c American columns in the 1970s, beginning with [3], and has since become a popular topic, discussed in articles like [4, 5] and textbooks on elementary mathematics and probabilit...
متن کاملIs Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?
Some crowdsourcing platforms ask workers to express their opinions by approving a set of k good alternatives. It seems that the only reasonable way to aggregate these k-approval votes is the approval voting rule, which simply counts the number of times each alternative was approved. We challenge this assertion by proposing a probabilistic framework of noisy voting, and asking whether approval v...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2239118