Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Decision Support Systems
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0167-9236
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.009