APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. Cole and Gkatzelis [3] recently proved that this problem admits a constant factor approximation. We complement their result by showing that this problem is APX-hard.
متن کاملNash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15] gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to maximize the Nash social welfare (NSW). We give constant factor algorithms for a substantial generalization of their problem – to the case of separable, piecewise-linear concave utility functions. We give two suc...
متن کاملGreedy Algorithms for Maximizing Nash Social Welfare
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents for their bundles. While the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is known to be APX-hard in general, we study the effectiveness of simple, gree...
متن کاملThe Nash Social Welfare Function
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Econometric Society is collaborating with JSTOR to dig...
متن کاملOrdinal Nash Social Welfare Function
A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed based on risk preferences and assuming a common, worst social state for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterisation of the solution is a weak version of IIA, in which only the relative risk position with respect to the worst state is considered. Thus the resulting social preference takes into account non (necessarily) ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Processing Letters
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0020-0190
DOI: 10.1016/j.ipl.2017.01.012