are children capable of collective intentionality?

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117-147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264-265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165-181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bac...

Are Intentionality Judgments Fundamentally Moral?

C onsiderable evidence documents the foundational role that judgments of intentionality play in human social cognition. Even before their first birthday, children distinguish intentional from unintentional behavior and soon learn to recognize the goals and beliefs that motivate intentional action. Adults’ judgments of intentionality are grounded in a sophisticated concept in which they consider...

Wittgenstein running: neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode.

In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie "we-mode" processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potent...

Pretend play and the development of collective intentionality

Young children’s pretend play is considered in the context of the development of collective intentionality. It is argued that (i) early pretending is an essentially social and culturally acquired form of action, and (ii) early social pretend play can be considered as the first form of true collective intentionality in ontogeny – involving shared cooperative activities and even some rudimentary ...