Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always Optimal?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Antitrust Bulletin
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0003-603X,1930-7969
DOI: 10.1177/0003603x0304800308