Are Policymakers Ambiguity Averse?*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez051