Are Stock-Financed Takeovers Opportunistic?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Are Takeovers Really Bad Deals for the Acquirers?
I document strong empirical evidence showing that in the face of unexpected industry shocks a majority of acquirers may pursue takeovers to catch up with competitors. This overriding motive for takeover leads to an important selfselection problem that is largely overlooked in previous studies: acquirers are more likely to be the firms that have high potential to create value in takeovers, but m...
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Table A1. Glossary of Governance and Takeover Germs Term Description Hostile takeover Acquirer makes takeover offer without target firm board consent or approval Unsolicited takeover Generally synonymous with hostile takeover. Also means the offer was not requested by the target firm board. Antitakeover provisions Target firm provisions in the bylaws or board approved motions to prevent unsolic...
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Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest an adverse selection role of corporate cash reserve. Specifically, if investors know a bidder does not have to issue to invest, an attempt to do so sends a strong pessimistic signal of overvaluation. Despite its intuitiveness, this notion has not been explicitly studied in the empirical literature. Using a sample of acquisitions that are solely financ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2356900