Arizona Initiatives and Referenda
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Timing of Ballot Initiatives: Evidence from Wisconsin School Referenda
One important consideration when studying direct democracy is the rules on agenda establishment. In their seminal series of articles, Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) identified the ability of a budget maximizing monopolist referendum agenda-setter to extract a greater amount of expenditure than desired by the median voter. While in Romer and Rosenthal’s models, the agenda setter exercised cont...
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The result of a referendum delivers a signi cant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice of an authority not to o¤er a referendum, although permitted to do so, may enhance the information individuals posses about social preferences as well. The addition of a referendum option in the rule...
متن کاملReferenda as a Catch-22
The result of a referendum delivers a signi cant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice not to o¤er a referendum by an authority, although permitted to do so, may enhance as well the information individuals posses about social preferences. The addition of a referendum option in the rule...
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In his famous dichotomy of consensual versus majoritarian democracies, Lijphart ~1984! claims that “consensual” means are more applicable in heterogeneous societies, while “majoritarian” means are more adequate in homogenous societies. While discussing at length many features of both consensual and majoritarian democracy, Lijphart refrains from reaching a conclusion concerning the desirability ...
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We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we formalize this concern and reach our main result: no voting rule can ensure representation if abstention is possib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Legal Reference Services Quarterly
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0270-319X,1540-949X
DOI: 10.1300/j113v26n03_03