Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asset market equilibrium: A simulation
This paper examines how an asset price is determined in a market, and how it changes as circumstances in the market change, making use of a standard asset price model. The motivation of the paper is to examine if the model can explain a bubble economy in which individuals are risk averse. It is known that if the relative risk aversion of an investor’s utility function does not exceed 1 and is n...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0131-5