Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction
In a property-rights framework, we study how the organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. Our model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. We admit general message-dependent contracts but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. This allows to fully characterize optimal contracts. First, we ...
متن کاملAsset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and holdup models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory: ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.338520