Assortative Matching, Adverse Selection, and Group Lending

Dynamic Lending in the Ghatak/Stiglitz/Weiss adverse selection model, with Comparison to Group Lending

We derive an optimal dynamic lending contract in a simple adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side. An optimal contract involves “penalty” rates after a default, and favorable rates after a success. It also charges higher rates for first-time borrowers than for repeat borrowers, as in “relationship” lending. We compare the efficiency of a group lending contract (of t...

Adverse Selection, Market Structure, and Competitive Pricing in Bank Lending

Matching markets with adverse selection

This paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quart. J. Econ. 90 (1976) 629). The major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open-ended and constantly refilled by new participants, e.g., by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market. The major novelty of this approach is that the distribution...

Assortative Matching and Reputation

Consider Becker’s (1973) classic matching model, with unobserved fixed types and stochastic publicly observed output. If types are complementary, then matching is assortative in the known Bayesian posteriors (the ‘reputations’). We discover a robust failure of Becker’s result in the simplest dynamic two type version of this world. Assortative matching is generally neither efficient nor an equil...

Assortative Matching and Search

In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types are complements: i.e. match output f(x, y) is supermodular in x and y. We reprise this famous result assuming timeintensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker’s cond...