منابع مشابه
Long-Term Care Insurance, Annuities and Asymmetric Information: The Case for Bundling Contracts.1
Within an asymmetric information set-up in which individuals di¤er in terms of their risk aversion and can choose whether or not to take preventative action, we illustrate in a uni ed framework the equilibrium possibilities with stand-alone long-term care insurance and annuity contracts. With costs of administering insurance, so that insurance is unfair, we show the existence of an equilibrium ...
متن کاملCollective Annuities and Redistribution. Collective Annuities and Redistribution
In a number of countries one observes a steady decline in defined benefits pensions schemes, public or private, funded or unfunded, and a simultaneous expansion of defined contributions plans. One of the consequences of this trend is to deprive individuals at the time of their retirement from the benefit of collective annuitization. Collective annuities can be distinguished from individual ones...
متن کاملAsymmetric Information and Rationalizability
We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this ...
متن کاملAmbiguity and Asymmetric Information
The theoretical literature has found that advantageous selection could be observed in equilibrium when there is multi-dimensional heterogeneity of customers or both hidden action and hidden information are employed. This paper proposes a third approach for advantageous selection. Based on the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, we consider ambiguity-averse individuals who face a gener...
متن کاملExternalities and Asymmetric Information*
A reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01462.x