Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9158-9