Asymmetric Risk and CEO Compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper aims to understand how firms’ asymmetric risk environment affects the CEO compensation structure. I investigate firm’s downside and upside potential differentially affect choice between cash equity stock options restricted compensation. First, show that, as (upside potential) increases, boards grant more (more compensation) less (less compensation). Second, that proportion of option in total increases with decreases potential. My findings support idea respond changes their environments by adjusting structure reflect risk-averse CEOs’ preferences.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The journal of applied business and economics
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1499-691X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33423/jabe.v25i3.6210