Attacker Dispersal Surface in the Turret Defense Differential Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC-PapersOnLine
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2405-8963
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.2549