Auctions with Limited Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auctions with Limited Commitment∗
We study auction design with limited commitment in a standard auction environment. The seller has a single object and can conduct an infinite sequence of standard auctions with reserve prices to maximize her expected profit. In each period, the seller can commit to a reserve price for the current period but cannot commit to future reserve prices. We analyze the problem with limited commitment t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170882