Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoringrules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterizedby the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and bytwo axioms specific to multiwinner rules, committee neutrality and committee dominance.In the course of ...
متن کاملCommittee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-$k$-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and $k$-Approval Chamberlin--Courant as the ...
متن کاملCommittee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy
We consider several natural classes of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWAbased, and decomposable rules. We study some of their axiomatic properties, especially properties of monotonicity, and concentrate on containment relations between them. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-approval Chamberlin–Courant, as the only rules in certain in...
متن کاملCommittee Scoring Rules
We present and advertise the class of committee scoring rules, recently introduced as multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules. We present a hierarchy of committee scoring rules (which includes all previously studied subclasses of committee scoring rules, as well as two new subclasses) and discuss their axiomatic properties (while focusing on fixed-majority consistency and monotonic...
متن کاملAxiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule
In the evaluation of experiments often the problem arises of how to compare the predictive success of competing probabilistic theories. The quadratic scoring rule can be used for this purpose. Originally, this rule was proposed as an incentive compatible elicitation method for probabilistic expert judgments. It is shown that up to a positive linear transformation, the quadratic scoring rule is ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.011