Backward Induction for Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Backward Induction in Games without Perfect Recall
The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), are explicitly restricted their analysis to games with perfect recall. In spite of this the concepts are well defined, exactl...
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Author Note Andrew M. Colman, Eva M. Krockow, Caren Frosch, and Briony D. Pulford, School of Psychology, University of Leicester. We are grateful to the Leicester Judgment and Decision Making Endowment Fund (Grant RM43G0176) for support in the preparation of this chapter. Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Andrew M. Colman, School of Psychology, University of Leiceste...
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The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the con ̄nes of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a di®erent branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by de ̄ning the notion of prediction. A sy...
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1 Draft, 4/14/03. This paper was prepared for the volume ?. Comments welcome. The forward induction data were collected in collaboration with Gerard Cachon. D:\Data\Mss\BGT\forward induction\forward induction\Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics.doc, Created on 3/21/2002 4:13 PM
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Following Kohlberg-Mertens [8, 1986], we investigate an axiomatic approach to non-cooperative solution concepts. A basic question in this program is identifying a backward-induction axiom (for general games). We show that three axioms—Existence, Rationality, and Difference—together characterize backward induction in perfect-information games satisfying a “single payoff condition.” We discuss im...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.275.5