Backward induction in presence of cycles
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Axioms for Backward Induction
Following Kohlberg-Mertens [8, 1986], we investigate an axiomatic approach to non-cooperative solution concepts. A basic question in this program is identifying a backward-induction axiom (for general games). We show that three axioms—Existence, Rationality, and Difference—together characterize backward induction in perfect-information games satisfying a “single payoff condition.” We discuss im...
متن کاملA Backward Induction Experiment
1 We thank Menesh Patel and John Straub for research assistance and thank Vince Crawford for helpful comments. The instructions and data for the experiments reported in this paper are posted at http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html. Financial support from the ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution at University College London, the National Science Foundation, and the Deutsch...
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We present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in sequential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) foresight type, following backward induction. Therefore we talk of limited backward induction (LBI). We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Players sequentially choose an integer within a range; th...
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The logic of backward induction (BI) in perfect information (PI) games has been intensely scrutinized for the past quarter century. A major development came in 2002, when P. Battigalli and M. Sinischalchi (BS) showed that an outcome of a PI game is consistent with common strong belief of utility maximization if and only if it is the BI outcome. Both BS’s formulation, and their proof, are comple...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic and Computation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0955-792X,1465-363X
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exy020