Backward Stackelberg Differential Game with Constraints: A Mixed Terminal-Perturbation and Linear-Quadratic Approach

نویسندگان

چکیده

We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving a single leader and follower. Unlike most literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by stochastic equation for which terminal- instead of initial-condition specified priori; decisions consist static terminal-perturbation dynamic linear-quadratic control. In addition, terminal control subject (convex-closed) pointwise (affine) expectation constraints. Both constraints arise from real applications such as mathematical finance. For information pattern, announces both at initial time while taking into account best response Then, two interrelated optimization problems are sequentially solved follower (a problem) mixed backward-forward LQ problem). Our equilibrium represented some coupled equations (BFSDEs) with initial-terminal conditions. BFSDEs also involve nonlinear projection operator (due constraint) combining Karush--Kuhn--Tucker system via Lagrange multiplier. The global solvability discussed in nontrivial cases. results applied one financial example.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Siam Journal on Control and Optimization

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0363-0129', '1095-7138']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1137/20m1340769