Bank dividends, agency costs and shareholder and creditor rights
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Financial Analysis
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1057-5219
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.12.007