منابع مشابه
Optimal central bank lending
We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model where the central bank supplies money outright via asset purchases and lends money temporarily against collateral. The terms of central bank lending a¤ect rationing of money and impact on macroeconomic aggregates. The central bank can set the policy rate and its ination target in a way that implements the rst best long-run allocation,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Investytsiyi: praktyka ta dosvid
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2306-6814
DOI: 10.32702/2306-6814.2019.23.35