Bank Leverage, Welfare, and Regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics
Regulatory constraints on bank leverage have been at the center of many policy discussions recently. One important question to emerge from these discussions has been whether these regulations should be time-dependent and how they would interact with the business cycle. We analyze this question using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banks and bank capital. In the model, bank c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3257957