Bank Opacity and Financial Crises

FINANCIAL CRISES AND LIQUIDITY SHOCKS: A Bank-Run Perspective

This note is motivated by trying to understand the macroeconomic implications of assuming that periods of financial bonanza and turmoil are driven by financial innovation and collapse in line with the “bank run” literature of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) variety. Bypassing a host of important but, for the present purposes, secondary details the note assumes that the initial effects of financial in...

Financial crises and bank failures: a review of prediction methods

In this article we provide a summary of empirical results obtained in several economics and operations research papers that attempt to explain, predict, or suggest remedies for financial crises or banking defaults, as well as outlines of the methodologies used. We analyze financial and economic circumstances associated with the US subprime mortgage crisis and the global financial turmoil that h...

Trade Credit versus Bank Credit during Financial Crises

Financial Crises and Political Crises∗

The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...

Competition and Bank Opacity

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the degree to which banks manage the information that they disclose to the public and regulators? We find that relaxing regulatory impediments to competition reduced discretionary loan loss provisioning and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that compet...