Banks’ loan charge-offs and macro-level risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
Prior studies document that delayed loan loss provisions can worsen financial stability by triggering a capital inadequacy concern. We extend prior literature and investigate how the treatment of charge-offs (LCOs) in statements is tied to macro-level risk U.S. banking industry. hypothesize find nondiscretionary LCOs are positively linked banks’ future systemic risk, whereas discretionary negatively correlated with risk. further show these effects driven two economic mechanisms: common exposure interconnectedness. This study first linkage between
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2214-6369', '2214-6350']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100573