Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining and network structure: An experiment
We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to proximity issues or restricted communication flows, as with information transmission of job openings, business opportunities, and transactions not easily regulated by external authorities. We perform an experimen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.248669