Bargaining Chains (Long Version)
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining in Supply Chains
We study experimentally bargaining in a multiple-tier supply chain with horizontal competition and sequential bargaining between tiers. Our treatments vary the cost differences between firms in tiers 1 and 2. We measure how these underlying costs influence the efficiency, negotiated prices and profit distribution across the supply chain, and the consistency of these outcomes with existing theor...
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Substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination. The majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains. Moreover, a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain. This paper investigates the equilibrium behavi...
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Research suggests that collaborative supply chain management (SCM) helps chain members create ‘‘a rising tide that lifts all boats.’’ Yet resource dependence theory suggests that when tides rise, some boats are lifted more than others; members who furnish important resources or resources where control is concentrated have bargaining power. Drawing on Thompson [Thompson, J.D., 1967. Organization...
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Evidence shows that suppliers refrain from investing in energy efficiency (EE) measures because they fear that a buyer with greater bargaining power will use the EE-related cost reductions to push prices down, in the purchase bargaining process, and thereby further reduce the supplier’s profit margin. Suppliers are also discouraged from EE investment by the uncertainty associated with new techn...
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Institutional rules provide natural deadlines for negotiations in legislative bargaining. In the continuous-time bargaining model framework of Ambrus and Lu (2010) we show that as the time horizon of the bargaining increases, equilibrium payoffs with deadline converge to stationary equilibrium payoffs of the infinite-horizon bargaining game. We provide a characterization of these limit payoffs,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1621867