Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?
Acommon thread in the economic sanctions literature is the assumption that multilateral cooperation among the potential sanctioning states is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for generating a successful outcome.1 Indeed, obtaining multilateral cooperation is so important that some scholars make this their dependent variable. Some of the more sophisticated work on economic coercion has fo...
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The fates of "transboundary" environmental systems depend on how nation states interact with one another. In the absence of a hegemon willing and able to coerce other states into avoiding a "tragedy of the commons," shared environments will be safeguarded if international cooperation succeeds and degraded or even destroyed if it fails. Treaties and related institutions of international law give...
متن کاملBargaining with Imperfect Enforcement
Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement* The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use 'non-cooperative' implementation. We p...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement∗
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is suffi ciently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a “one-time enforcer punishment equilibrium,” where any deviation b...
متن کاملBargaining Power and Enforcement in Credit Markets
In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Organization
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0020-8183,1531-5088
DOI: 10.1162/002081898753162820