Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q ≥ 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all singlepeak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniquenes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001