Bargaining over a common categorisation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining over a common conceptual space∗
Two agents endowed with different individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple noncooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equil...
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When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game’s outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents’ ability to realize gains from such speculative bets when their priors are private information? We apply a “mechanism design” approach to this...
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id=1937658; Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-15, 2010) [hereinafter Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544008; Patrick Greenlee & David Reitman, Competing with Loyalty Discounts (Econ. Analysis Grp., ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0790-5