Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic bargaining over gains and losses: Evidence from the lab
We design experiments to investigate predictions of the Merlo and Wilson (1995) stochastic bargaining theory. We construct four Merlo-Wilson games where the timing and efficiency of the equilibrium predictions differ, and study them in both gain and loss domains. We find little equilibrium play, but rather that it is most common to agree to equal splits in efficient stages, i.e. stages with max...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/262067