Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: With experimental test
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements
It is sometimes the case that some economic goods are perfect complements to some agents, but not to all agents. As an illustration, consider the following highly stylized story. A regulator faces the problem of pricing the use of a given network, e.g., a highway network. For our purposes, a network is simply a graph, with no loop. Each edge of the graph has a capacity: the maximal amount of tr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.041