Bargaining with Interdependent Values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with Interdependent Values
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal determining the value of the object to both players, while the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00706.x