منابع مشابه
Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. B...
متن کاملBargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules
We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance...
متن کاملBargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules
We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. Particularly, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere...
متن کاملRelative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions
Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is impossible to establish. In a large class of bargaining problems, however, a ranking of the relative disagreement-point monotonicity of these prominent bargaining solutions can be obtained. Using the ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ class of barga...
متن کاملTo “ a Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Bargaining ”
THEOREM 9: For each i, let a be a pure action profile in the stage game. If aii is a best response to ai−i for both i and (π2 −π1) · (u(a2)− u(a1)) > 0, then the following two-state automaton strategy, with states 1 and 2, yields a BSG set for δ sufficiently high: • Disagreement: In state i, make no transfers and play a in the action phase. If player j = i deviates unilaterally, go to state j; ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Strategic Behavior and the Environment
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1944-0138
DOI: 10.1561/102.00000019