Behavior-based pricing under imperfectly informed consumers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Behavior-based pricing under imperfectly informed consumers
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Economics and Policy
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-6245
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.06.007